The Evolution of Lying in a Spatially-Explicit Prisoner’s Dilemma Model

arXiv:2602.02587v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: I present the results from a spatial model of the prisoner’s dilemma, played on a toroidal lattice. Each individual has a default strategy of either cooperating ($C$) or defecting ($D$). Two strategies were tested, including “tit-for-tat” (TFT), in which individuals play their opponent’s last play, or simply playing their default play. Each individual also has a probability of telling the truth ($0 leq P_{truth} leq 1$) about their last play. This parameter, which can evolve over time, allows individuals to be, for instance, a defector but present as a cooperator regarding their last play. This leads to interesting dynamics where mixed populations of defectors and cooperators with $P_{truth} geq 0.75$ move toward populations of truth-telling cooperators. Likewise, mixed populations with $P_{truth}